A Meeting Place for Evangelicals, Reformed, and Orthodox Christians

Category: Church Fathers (Page 7 of 12)

TF Torrance and Reformed-Orthodox Dialogue

Review: Participatio – Centennial Volume 4: T.F. Torrance (2013)

 

TF Torrance

TF Torrance

Thomas Forsyth Torrance, 1913-2007, commonly known as TF Torrance, was a Scottish Presbyterian theologian.  He served as Professor of Christian Dogmatics at New College, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh.  He is widely known for his pioneering works on science and theology.  He also played a key role in the theological dialogues between the Reformed and Orthodox communities.

In 2013, the Thomas F. Torrance Theological Fellowship published a centenary issue of Participatio marking the occasion of Torrance’s birth.  The issue comprises a mix of personal reflections by those who knew him, some scholarly articles on aspects of his theology, correspondences between Torrance and Orthodox theologian Georges Florovsky, and two essays by Torrance himself on Orthodoxy.  This makes for an especially rich and complex set of materials for those who want to learn more about Torrance as well as coming to grips with his interactions with Orthodoxy.

I thank Matthew Baker for bringing this centennial edition to my attention.  In this blog posting I will be reviewing Participatio with an eye to Reformed and Orthodox dialogue.  The articles deal with important theological issues like: justification, the divine monarchia, the concept of energy, and Church Fathers like: Athanasius, Ephrem the Syrian, Cyril of Alexandria, Mark the Monk, and Maximus the Confessor.  I will be discussing just a few of the articles published.  It is hoped that will be further interactions by others with the other articles in the centenary issue.

 

TF Torrance and Theology

Probably the word that best describe Torrance’s theology is: versatile.  He is widely known for his pioneering work in the study of theology and science as well as for his works in systematic theology.  Unlike most Protestant theologians who favored systematic theology, Torrance preferred the historic dogmas of the Church.  He did not hold to systematic theology because he believed that God was not “systematic” and because he felt systematic theology represented a holdover from the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages (Pelphrey pp. 56-57).  In his classroom lectures Torrance was especially enthusiastic about three theologians: Athanasius, Calvin, and Barth! (Noble p. 15)  Torrance’s admiration for Athanasius was such that he had an icon of Athanasius on prominent display in his office!  (Dragas p. 32)

Torrance points to the broader element in the Reformed tradition.  While some were hostile or suspicious of Barth’s theology, others like Torrance were receptive to it.  He was also critical of certain elements of Reformed theology, at least of the Dutch variant.

On this occasion, a student had defended the doctrine of Limited Atonement, arguing that Christ died only for the elect and not for all. Torrance’s reply was devastating: “That Christ did not die for all is the worst possible argument for those who claim to believe in verbal inspiration!” (Noble p. 14)

Torrance’s rejection of limited atonement stemmed from his loyalty to the Scottish stream of the Reformed tradition and that particular tradition’s debate with “scholastic federal Calvinism” (Noble p. 15).

 

Torrance and Reformed-Orthodox Dialogue

Torrance was one of the rare Reformed theologians of the twentieth century who not only studied the early Church Fathers but also engaged in extensive conversation with Orthodox Christians.  He was in frequent correspondence with one of the leading twentieth century Orthodox theologian, Georges Florovsky.  The warmth of their friendship is evident in the letters published in the centennial issue (pp. 287-324).  Florovsky regarded Torrance as one theologian that the Orthodox should give heed to (Dragas p. 34).  Another one of Orthodoxy’s leading modern theologian, John Zizioulas, author of Being As Communion, once served as Torrance’s teaching assistant.  In the course of his academic career Torrance got to know Orthodox Christians who would later become prominent hierarchs, e.g., Archbishop Methodios Fouyas, who arranged for Torrance to be given the title of “honorary protopresbyter” by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria (Baker Note 81, p. 317).

During the 1970s Torrance worked hard to promote theological dialogue between the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  Despite his immense knowledge of Athanasius and other Church Fathers, Torrance apparently was unaware of how the Orthodox did theology.  On this occasion Torrance wanted to draft a letter opening the way for Reformed dialogue with the Patriarch of Constantinople.  Dragas recounted:

I replied: “Professor Tom, this will not fly. Let me go through it and explain why.” He listened to me for a half an hour without saying a word (!), while I went sentence by sentence through his memorandum. Among other things, I said: “No Orthodox would approve of this opposition between the Alexandrians and the Cappadocians – we do not see the Fathers this way. Likewise, when you first go to approach an Orthodox Patriarch to ask him for a dialogue, you should not come with criticisms about his Orthodox theologians and their theological tradition. Rather, you should first present your credentials as Christians and state that in faithful obedience to the will of Christ you approach the Orthodox with a wish to be reconciled. You need first to explain to them who you are, what you believe and practice as Reformed Christians, that you have ordained clergy and sacraments, synods and so forth, and what all these mean to you.” I also suggested that he give the patriarch a copy of the Reformed Prayer Book as a gift. He was baffled, and asked: “Which Prayer Book? Every Reformed Church has its own.” (Dragas p. 39)

I laughed when I read of Torrance’s bafflement.  As a Reformed Christian who became Orthodox I can relate to both sides.  The difference here is the ancient principle: lex orandi, lex credendi.  Where for Reformed Christians a prayer book expresses what they believe, for the Orthodox the liturgical texts prescribes and regulates what they believe.  For the Orthodox one cannot willy nilly change the prayer books because the liturgical services are part of the received tradition of the Church.

In the 1980s under Torrance’s leadership a number of Reformed-Orthodox dialogues were held culminating in the “Agreed Statement on the Holy Trinity” in 1991.  But as Matthew Baker noted in his interview with Dragas the Agreed Statement seems to have been all but forgotten by the Orthodox.  Dragas’ explanation (p. 41) as to why the Agreed Statement was short lived is educational for any who wish to engage in serious ecumenical dialogue between the Reformed and Orthodox traditions.

Florovsky wrote this frank appraisal of the prospects for unity in Torrance’s “Our Oneness in Christ and Our Disunity as Churches”:

It is our tragedy that we cannot travel beyond a certain narrow limit. It would not help at all if I, as it were, “pass” the document. It would not make it any more “ecumenical,” and somebody else will point it out. I am terribly disturbed that, being brethren and friends in the sacred name of Jesus, we cannot meet at His table. But the tragedy is that we cannot, simply and purely. Let us pray together and for each other, and do what we can do together, trusting in the mercy of the Lord. (p. 312)

TF Torrance’s career points to the potential for fruitful Reformed-Orthodox dialogue but it also points to the perils of pursuing ecclesial unity.  This writer considers the former to be feasible but the latter unlikely.

 

Torrance on Orthodox Worship

Torrance was highly appreciative of the fact that Orthodoxy has preserved the ancient form of worship and warned Protestants against thinking that their simplified form of worship represented New Testament worship.

It would be a very great mistake for us Protestants to imagine that the way in which we worship God is a return to the simplicity of the New Testament – our Protestant worship is very far removed from the worship of the Early Christians which was grounded on a profound unity between the Old Testament and the New Testament. (Torrance p. 330)

No doubt the liturgy has become more elaborate through time, largely through further adaptations of the Old Testament ways of worship, but it remains essentially the same, and it is, I believe – let me say it quite frankly – still the most biblically grounded worship I know: grounded in the whole Bible. (Torrance p. 331)

Torrance took note of the constraints placed on Calvin that led him further away from the historic forms of worship.

Calvin himself did not know as much about the worship of the Early Church as we do, and unfortunately he allowed the mediaeval Jewish scholars to have too great an influence on his interpretation of the Bible so that he swept away many of the biblical forms of worship handed down from the Early Church. (Torrance pp. 331-332)

Torrance saw much value in the Orthodox liturgical tradition and sought to incorporate this into the Church of Scotland (Torrance p. 332).  However, ressourcement is quite different from the traditioning process that is part of Orthodoxy.  Where ressourcement allows the theologian considerable latitude as to which Church Father or teachings may be incorporated into their theological system, the traditioning process is much more constricted — the bishop or priest commits himself to following Holy Tradition as it has been transmitted from the Apostles.

 

 “The Relevance of Orthodoxy”

Careful reading of Torrance’s essay “The Relevance of Orthodoxy” (pp. 324-332) shows points of contact and differences.  Torrance understood the Nicene Creed as emerging from the early Church’s exegesis of Scripture.  This strikes me as a rather Protestant approach, understandable in light of his church background, but at odds with Orthodoxy.  Torrance wrote:

The Nicene Creed was distilled, as it were, through careful exegesis of the Scriptures, in order to find a basic and accurate way of expressing those essentials of the Christian faith, apart from which it cannot remain faithful to the Gospel. Hence in the tradition of the Orthodox Church the Nicene Creed has the effect of throwing the mind of the Church back upon the Holy Scriptures, and making them central in all its worship, doctrine, and life. (Torrance p. 326)

I would argue that the Nicene Creed emerged out of the interaction between the regula fidei (rule of faith) handed down by the bishops and the Church’s reading of Scripture, that is between oral tradition and written tradition.  I noticed that Torrance made no mention of oral tradition in his essay.  This is a significant omission because it is in oral tradition that the sense of Scripture is preserved.  If one looks at the early patristic writings, e.g., Irenaeus of Lyons, one finds that the rule of faith (creed) was derived from oral tradition, not from Scripture (Against Heresies 1.10.1).  Without this sense of the inner meaning obtained from oral tradition, the Scriptural text becomes susceptible to unconventional and even deviant interpretations that stray far from what the Apostles had in mind in the first place.

I also find it striking that Torrance had little to say about the episcopacy and the magisterium (teaching authority) of the bishop.  This oversight becomes even more apparent when I read what he had to say about the Filioque clause; the clause that bedeviled church relations for a thousand years to this day.

There is a difference between the Eastern and Western forms of the Nicene Creed, for the Western Church speaks of the Spirit as ‘proceeding from the Father and the Son’ whereas the Eastern Church speaks of the Spirit only as ‘proceeding from the Father’, but actually the Eastern Church thinks of that as taking place through the Son, not as through the Church. Thus in spite of the different formulations of the East and the West the Eastern Church is more Christological and preserves the Mystery of the Spirit in a way that is so often lost in the West. One of the effects of the Orthodox doctrine of the Spirit is found in the way in which they regard the structures of the Church’s life and thought as open structures, shaped by the mystery of Christ and open to the transcendent Majesty and Lordship of God. (Torrance p. 328)

Torrance understood the Nicene Creed descriptively, not prescriptively, that is, it articulates the theological consensus of the Christian community.  In significant contrast the Orthodox understand the Nicene Creed to be binding on all Christians because it was promulgated by an Ecumenical Council which represents the Church guided by the Holy Spirit.  This is because at the Council of Nicea the bishops exercised their magisterium as a collective body.  Furthermore, as it was formulated and promulgated by an Ecumenical Council, no one, including the Bishop of Rome, has the authority to modify the Creed.  Torrance’s silence with respect to the role of the bishops’ magisterium in the Nicene Creed is quite revealing to Orthodox Christians.  So, as much as Torrance is sympathetic to the Orthodox Church’s position, he does not seem to get it at certain significant points of doctrine and polity.

 

Cyril of Alexandria and Justification

Donald Fairbairn’s article “Justification in St. Cyril of Alexandria, With Some Implications for Ecumenical Dialogue” (pp. 123-146) is an attempt to flesh out one of Torrance’s insight.  Torrance once noted that Cyril of Alexandria was the best expositor of the Evangelical doctrine of justification by grace but made no attempt to elaborate on that statement and so the task of doing so fell on Fairbairn’s shoulders (p. 124).

The challenge here lay in finding in Cyril the Protestant understanding of justification as a passively received righteousness and sanctification as a cooperatively produced holiness/righteousness (Fairbairn p. 126).  This distinction is key to Protestant theology.  In light of the fact that Cyril conflates justification with sanctification it has been inferred that he is advocating an active works righteousness that the Reformers strenuously opposed.  Fairbairn argues that what Cyril had in mind was that justification and sanctification were both created by God in the believer as a result of the believer’s union with Christ (Fairbairn p. 127).

Using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae search engine Fairbairn was able to gather data about Cyril’s understanding of justification.  What he found was the overwhelming use of the passive form (Fairbairn p. 128).  Cyril’s understanding justification and sanctification as passively received is based on his understanding of the Incarnation.  Fairbairn notes,

It is that God the Son became human precisely so that he, God, could do as man something for human beings that we could not do for ourselves. This Christological emphasis dovetails closely with the idea that Christ gives the believer a righteousness from without. For Cyril, even the human side of salvation is not primarily our human action; it is Christ’s human action. In order for that human action to accomplish our salvation, it had to be human action performed by God the Son. (p. 142; italics in original)

I very much appreciate Fairbairn’s even handed conclusion.  He noted the even with the strong similarities between Cyril and Protestantism (justification as passive) differences remain (Cyril’s failing to distinguish sharply between justification and sanctification) (p. 142).  Especially striking is Fairbairn’s statement that justification was not central to Cyril’s soteriology (p. 142).  I appreciate the irenic tone in Prof. Fairbairn’s challenge to both Protestants and Orthodox.

As a result, I suggest that a deeper consideration of Cyril’s doctrine of justification can both challenge Protestants and the Orthodox, and help to uncover latent common ground between them. Protestants need to recognize that justification is not merely or even mainly transactional, but primarily personal and organic. We are united to Christ as a person, and as a result, his righteousness is imputed to us. The forensic crediting of righteousness grows out of the personal union. (p. 144)

The concept of “justification by faith” is something shared by both Protestants and Orthodox but they diverge with respect to their understanding of what justification is and how it applies to the Christian.  Prof. Fairbairn’s approaching “justification by faith” via patristics is promising.  It should be kept in mind though that Cyril is just one Church Father among a whole range of other Church Fathers.

 

The Divine Energies

Stoyan Tanev’s article “The Concept of Energy in TF Torrance and Orthodox Theology” (pp. 190-212) touches on the Essence-Energy distinction, a subject that sets Western theologians and Torrance apart from the Orthodox.  The issue of our ability to come to knowledge of God came to forefront in the Hesychast controversyPalamas wrote that while God is unknowable in His Essence, we can know God through his Energies.  Barlaam rejected the Hesychasts’ claim that our bodies and our minds can be transfigured by the divine light.   At the Great Councils of Constantinople in 1341 and 1351, the Orthodox Church affirmed Gregory’s distinction between the Divine Essence and Energies making it a dogma of the Orthodox Church (Tanev p. 193).  This controversy is not one familiar to many Protestants.  But, nonetheless, from this controversy came positions and insights that can help deepen the Reformed understanding of God and the Trinity.  Tanev’s essay is helpful in that it approaches Torrance from the standpoint of theology, patristics, and modern science.

Torrance did not hold to the Essence-Energy distinction (p. 193).  One of his constant concerns was guarding against a dualism that sets theology against economy (pp. 194-195).  Tanev notes that Torrance did not quite grasp the later Byzantine theology which resulted in the constraining of his understanding to the pre-Chalcedonian legacy of Athanasius and Cyril (p. 202).

One fascinating aspect of Tanev’s essay is his discussion of how Torrance’s understanding of space shaped his theology.  Tanev criticized Torrance’s for his narrow understanding of science, e.g., he embracing Einstein while rejecting quantum theory (pp. 204-205).  Torrance’s commitment to realism prevented him from embracing Bohr’s quantum theory which posited that a quantum object might possess complementary energetic manifestations that depended on the circumstances of the interaction between the observer and the object (pp. 206-207).  One notable contribution in quantum physics is the discovery that there is no simple objective study of physical phenomenon; “observed reality can be transformed by the fact of observing it.” (p. 207)  This gives physical reality a dynamic and probabilistic character much like “the freedom of interpersonal human relations” (p. 209).  Tanev saw Torrance’s failing to draw on the epistemological implications of quantum theory as contributing to his lacking a proper understanding of hypostasis (p. 208; 210-211).  As a corrective to Torrance’s realism, Tanev presents Christos Yannaras who appropriated Einstein and Bohr to explicate John of Damascus who saw physical space as a locus of the disclosure of God’s personal energy (p. 210).

The distinction between the nature and the energies of God, without denying the reality of the natural distance of God from the world, preserves the world as a space of the immediate personal nearness of God and manifests God as the place of the universe: “For God is not contained, but is himself the place of all.”  (p. 210)

Torrance’s attempt to integrate theology with modern physics has yielded some interesting insights.  Tanev shows how quantum physics can lend support for the Orthodox approach to describing the Trinity.  Admittedly, this is a rather novel theological method for Orthodox Christians.  Tanev’s article is an example where the methodology of Western systematic theology can lead to interesting insights.

 

Torrance and Zizioulas on the Divine Monarchia

Dragas’ explication of how Torrance and Zizioulas understood the Trinity differently is both fascinating and insightful (pp. 43-45).  Torrance preferred to emphasize “the monarchy of the entire Trinity instead of the unique monarchy of the Father.”  This means that “the Trinity as revealed in the economy is wholly identical with the essential Trinity in eternity” (p. 43).  This position aligns Torrance with Barth, Rahner, and other Western theologians but against the Eastern theologians who insist that in the economy God does not reveal his Essence, but instead is revealed as Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through his energies (p. 43).  Torrance’s suspicion of drawing a distinction between God as Being and Act made him suspicious of the Cappadocian Fathers who insisted on the Monarchy of the Father as the best approach to understanding the Trinity.

Nikolaos Asproulis’ “T.F. Torrance and John Zizioulas on the Divine Monarchia: The Cappadocian Background and the Neo-Cappadocian Solution” (pp. 162-189) is an important essay given Torrance’s rejection of the Cappadocian teaching on the monarchy of God the Father.  This constitutes one of the biggest differences between Torrance and Orthodoxy for all his sympathies for Orthodoxy.  In his approach to patristics Torrance was fascinated with one particular figure, Athanasius the Great, and with two concepts: homoousios and perichoresis.

In this essay Asproulis compares Torrance against one of Orthodoxy’s leading modern theologian, John Zizioulas.  Asproulis notes that what sets Zizioulas apart was the fact that he did not approach the Church Fathers in terms of the historical study of texts but favored a more systematic exploration of theological concepts.  This is an example of an Orthodox theologian benefiting from the Western theological method.  Asproulis draws attention that something of a paradigm shift took place when the Cappadocians began assigning an ontological reality to the term “prosopon” which up till then simply meant “a mask worn by actors” (pp. 166-167).

In this light, the Eucharist renders possible the participation by communion in the very life of God, which is communion of persons caused by the person of the God the Father. In Zizioulas’ understanding, this communion legitimates discussion about God’s very being, the question of how God is – his personal mode of existence – rather than the what of the ineffable divine ousia. Where Torrance took as his starting point the economic self-manifestation of God in Christ, Zizioulas took a meta-historical approach beginning with doxological formula: Glory be to the Father, with the Son, and with the Holy Spirit (p. 168).

Asproulis notes that where the starting point for Torrance’s theology was the narrative of biblical revelation, for Zizioulas it was the Eucharistic experience of the early Christians (pp. 181-182).  He notes that Zizioulas’ theological method leads to a diminishment of the unity between theology and economy (p. 182).  Asproulis criticize both Torrance and Zizioulas for having too narrow a patristic base for doing theology: Torrance for relying almost exclusively on Athanasius and Zizioulas on the three Cappadocians (p. 183).

What makes Asproulis’ essay especially valuable for Reformed-Orthodox dialogue is his presenting an excerpt from Gregory of Nazianzus’ Fifth Theological Oration 31.14 on the divine monarchia that was read by Torrance and Zizioulas in different ways (p. 186).  Asproulis then brings to our attention Gregory’s Oration 42.15 and uses this to criticize both Torrance and Zizioulas (p. 187).  What is to be appreciated about Asproulis’ essay is his attempt to assess the theological differences of two great ecumenical thinkers of the twentieth century on the methodological level.

 

An Assessment

This centennial edition will be valuable for students of TF Torrance’s thought who want to better understand Torrance’s understanding of the Trinity and his engagement with the Church Fathers.  It will also be valuable for those interested in Reformed-Orthodox dialogue.  Baker notes:

As readers of this volume will discover, not everything Torrance had to say is acceptable to the Orthodox. The disagreements are real, and they are not trifling. But the affinities also are significant, and the mutual respect is profound. Orthodox theologians still have much to gain from Torrance on multiple fronts: his creative and forceful presentation of Athanasian-Cyrilline Christology, most especially regarding the high priestly work of Christ; his re-articulation of patristic hermeneutics and rigorous treatment of theological epistemology in response to modern challenges; and his patristic-inspired forays into theology-science dialogue. (p. 7)

In my opinion TF Torrance’s biggest contribution towards Reformed-Orthodox theological dialogue took place in his role as a professor and mentor to various Orthodox Christians.  It is thanks to him that we can benefit from the superb scholarship of Andrew Louth and John Zizioulas.  Personal relationships across theological traditions are especially beneficial.  This can happen at the advanced graduate level where strong personal ties are often forged in the course of advanced theological studies.

There are two common grounds that the Reformed and the Orthodox share: Scripture and the Church Fathers.  Grounding Reformed-Orthodox dialogue in these two areas would be a good starting point.  I would venture that one arena where Reformed and Orthodox dialogue can be advanced is in the academy in disciplines like theology.

The contributions made in this edition of Participatio shows the fruits of interaction between Orthodox and Reformed on issues like the divine Monarchy, the concept of Divine Energy, the Persons of the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.  There is much potential in the interaction between Orthodoxy’s grounding in patristics and the Reformed grounding in dogmatics and systematic theology.  The benefits of Western systematic theology are the rigor and disciplined thinking it brings to the field of theology.  Absent intellectual rigor patristics and liturgics can easily end up in an unthinking traditionalism that uncritically reiterates the past.  Journals like Participatio can play a strategic role in advancing Reformed-Orthodox dialogue by encouraging scholars to submit articles dealing with topics of interest across the two traditions and that endeavor to examine these topics using the theological methods from the two traditions.

As a theology professor Torrance put his focus on dogmatics rather than systematic theology.  Torrance can serve as an example for other Protestant theologians to follow.  It would help if Protestant seminaries were to offer theology classes ordered along the line of dogmatics and patristics.  This method is closer to the way Eastern Orthodox Christians do theology and would make initial contact and dialogue much easier.  The systematic approach favored by Western theologians is alien to Orthodoxy and has often impeded Reformed-Orthodox dialogue.

One of Torrance’s greatest shortcomings was his failing to understand or take seriously the conciliar nature of Orthodox theology.  This failing seems to apply not just to Torrance, but to other Protestants as well.  To put it simply, Reformed theologians do theology textually, that is, they read the text (Scripture or the Church Fathers), extract data, then proceed to organize and coordinate the data into coherent theological systems.  Orthodox theologians do theology ecclesially, that is, they seek to articulate what the Church has taught and confessed through its worship and through its councils.  Until Protestants grapple with the ecclesial and conciliar dimensions of doing theology, theological dialogue between Reformed and Orthodox Christians will be hampered by misunderstandings and people speaking past each other.

Protestant theologians need to engage in a critical scrutiny of theological methods, both theirs and those outside the Protestant tradition.  For example, Reformed Christians need to discuss with the Orthodox the importance of the Ecumenical Councils and the patristic consensus for doing theology.  Also, they will need to discuss with Orthodox Christians the implications of Christ’s promise to send the Holy Spirit in John 14:26 for the role of the Church in doing theology.  By bringing to light some basic differences between the Reformed and Orthodox traditions, these questions can facilitate and open and honest interfaith dialogue.

TF Torrance’s eagerness to engage Orthodoxy presents a model for other Reformed Christians.  All too often one finds Reformed theologians who are quick to stereotype Orthodox Christianity or who fail to read the Church Fathers in their historical context.  Given the fractured state of Protestantism and the plurality of Protestant theologies, there is much to be gained from engaging Orthodoxy’s ancient theological and spiritual heritage.  Orthodoxy offers the Reformed theologians a means of accessing the Church of the early Church Fathers and Ecumenical Councils.  If Reformed and Orthodox theologians can interact with each other using theological methods that integrate biblical exegesis with patristics, disciplined theological reflection, and sensitivity to ecclesial structures I am confident that the common ground between the two traditions will be broadened and deepened to the benefit of both sides.

Robert Arakaki

 

Note: I briefly touched on Torrance in one of my earlier postings: “Platonic Dualism in the Reformed Understanding of the Real Presence?

See also a  podcast by Fr. George Dragas’ Assessment of TF Torrance

 

 

Calvin Dissing the Fathers

 

John Calvin

John Calvin

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In an earlier blog posting “Plucking the TULIP,” I marshaled an array of patristic citations showing that a wide range of early church fathers affirmed human free will: Irenaeus of Lyons, Cyril of Jerusalem, John of Damascus, John of the Ladder, Gregory of Nyssa et al.  I did this to show that the theological consensus of the early Church refuted the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination.

When I wrote it I wondered how Calvin would have responded to my patristic argument.  I recently found the answer when in the course of browsing Calvin’s Institutes I came across the subsection titled “The church fathers generally show less clarity but a tendency to accept freedom of the will.  What is free will?” (2.2.4, pp. 258-261)

Calvin opened with the following statement:

All ecclesiastical writers have recognized both that the soundness of reason in man is gravely wounded through sin, and that the will has been very much enslaved by evil desires.

This also reflects the Orthodox understanding of humanity’s fallen condition and our still having free will and the capacity to reason.  However, Calvin criticized this understanding of the human condition charging that the early church fathers in affirming human reason came “far too close to the philosophers.”  He is of the belief that the early fathers took this position in order to avoid “the jeers of the philosophers.”  Then he made the claim the fathers affirmed human free will in order “not to give occasion for slothfulness.”  He wrote:

Surely you see by these statements that they credited man with more zeal for virtue than he deserved because they thought that they could not rouse our inborn sluggishness unless they argued that we sinned by it alone.

 

Dissing the Fathers

Calvin’s low opinion of the Greek fathers comes across loud and clear in the following sentence:

Further, even though the Greeks above the rest—and Chrysostom especially among them—extol the ability of the human will, yet all the ancients, save Augustine, so differ, waver, or speak confusedly on this subject, that almost nothing certain can be derived from their writings. (Emphasis added.)

The above sentence is pure dynamite.  One, Calvin was aware of the early fathers (“all the ancients”) affirmation of free will.  Two, that he believed the church fathers spoke “confusedly” meaning there was no patristic consensus on free will.  Three, nothing worthwhile can be learned from the early church fathers on this matter.  Four, the sole exception among the early church fathers is Augustine.

These are all very interesting theses, but like any set of theses they need to be backed up evidence and arguments.  It is disappointing, therefore, to find that Calvin disdains to provide supporting evidence.

Therefore, we shall not stop to list more exactly the opinions of individual writers; but we shall only select at random from one or another, as the explanation of the argument would seem to demand.

 

My Response to Calvin

If Calvin will not “list more exactly the opinions of individual writers,” then I will.  The following citations are presented to show the breadth and depth of the early Church’s affirmation of human free will.

Ignatius of Antioch (d. 98/117), one of the Apostolic Fathers, affirmed human free will:

Seeing, then, all things have an end, and there is set before us life upon our observance [of God’s precepts], but death as the result of disobedience, and every one, according to the choice he makes, shall go to his own place, let us flee from death, and make choice of life. For I remark, that two different characters are found among men — the one true coin, the other spurious. The truly devout man is the right kind of coin, stamped by God Himself. The ungodly man, again, is false coin, unlawful, spurious, counterfeit, wrought not by God, but by the devil. I do not mean to say that there are two different human natures, but that there is one humanity, sometimes belonging to God, and sometimes to the devil. If any one is truly religious, he is a man of God; but if he is irreligious, he is a man of the devil, made such, not by nature, but by his own choice.  (Letter to the Magnesians – long version, Chapter 5; ANF Vol. I p. 61; emphasis added.)

The Epistle to Diognetus, considered part of the Apostolic Fathers corpus, affirmed human free will:

. . . as a king sending a son, he sent him as King, he sent him as God, he sent him as Man to men, he was saving and persuading when he sent him, not compelling, for compulsion is not an attribute of God (Epistle to Diognetus 7.3; Loeb Classical Library Vol. II, p. 365; emphasis added).

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 90-100) has been cited in support of free will (see Recognitions 9.30).  However, serious concerns have been raised about the authenticity of the Recognitions (Quasten’s Patrology Vol. I, p. 61-62).

Justin Martyr (c. 100-165), an early Apologist who was schooled in classical philosophy before his conversion, wrote:

For the coming into being at first was not in our own power; and in order that we may follow those things which please Him, choosing them by means of the rational faculties He has Himself endowed us with, He both persuades us and leads us to faith (First Apology 10; ANF Vol. I, p. 165; emphasis added).

Athenagoras (2nd century), another early Apologist, wrote:

Just as with men, who have freedom of choice as to both virtue and vice (for you would not either honour the good or punish the bad, unless vice and virtue were in their own power . . . . (Athenagoras’ Plea 24, ANF Vol. II p. 142; emphasis added).

Irenaeus of Lyons (fl. c. 175-c. 195), regarded as the greatest theologian of the second century, likewise affirmed man’s capacity for faith was based in his free will:

Now all such expressions demonstrate that man is in his own power with respect to faith (Against Heresies 4.37.2; ANF Vol. I, p. 520).

Cyprian of Carthage (c. 200/210-258), the spiritual son of Tertullian and one of the Latin Fathers, affirmed human free will.  Treatise No. 52 is titled “That the liberty of believing or of not believing is placed in free choice.” (ANF Vol. V p. 547; emphasis added)  He gave three Scripture passages in support of this teaching: Deuteronomy 13:19, Isaiah 1:19, and Luke 17:21.

Athanasius the Great (c. 296-373) was renowned for his defense of Christi’s divine nature. In the Life of Anthony §20 he wrote that human virtue depends on the existence of human free will:

Wherefore virtue hath need at our hands of willingness alone, since it is in us and is formed from us (NPNF Vol. IV p. 201).

Origen of Alexandria (c. 185-c. 254) in De Principiis Preface §5 made this observation about the general opinion of the Church:

This also is clearly defined in the teaching of the Church, that every rational soul is possessed of free-will and volition; (NPNF Vol. IV p. 240).

Just as significant is the fact that the denial of human free will was rejected as an erroneous teaching.  The opposite of free will is “necessity-constrained will,” this Vincent of Lerins (d. before 450) in his Commonitory noted is heretical because it makes sin to be irresistible.

. . . a human nature of such a description, that of its own motion, and by the impulse of its necessity-constrained will, it can do nothing else, can will nothing else, but sin . . . . (Commonitory Chapter 24, NPNF Vol. XI p. 150; emphasis added)

A similar condemnation can be found in Methodius (d. c. 311) in The Banquet of the Ten Virgins:

Now those who decide that man is not possessed of free-will and affirm that he is governed by the unavoidable necessities of fate, and her unwritten commands, are guilty of impiety towards God Himself, making Him out to be the cause and author of human evils (Chapter 16, ANF Vol. VI p. 342; emphasis added).

John Chrysostom (c. 349/354-407), famous for his preaching and patriarch of Constantinople, likewise condemned the denial of human free will in his third homily on Timothy:

Having thus enlarged upon the love of God which, not content with showing mercy to a blasphemer and persecutor, conferred upon him other blessings in abundance, he has guarded against that error of the unbelievers which takes away free will, by adding, “with faith and love which is in Christ Jesus.” (NPNF First Series Vol. XIII p. 418)

Another significant witness to free will is Cyril of Jerusalem (c. 310-386), Patriarch of Jerusalem in the fourth century.  In his famous catechetical lectures, Cyril repeatedly affirmed human free-will (Lectures 2.1-2 and 4.18, 21; NPNF Second Series Vol. VII, pp. 8-9, 23-24).

Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa (330-c. 395), in his catechetical lectures, taught:

For He who made man for the participation of His own peculiar good, and incorporated in him the instincts for all that was excellent, in order that his desire might be carried forward by a corresponding movement in each case to its like, would never have deprived him of that most excellent and precious of all goods; I mean the gift implied in being his own master, and having a free will. (The Great Catechism Lecture 5, NPNF Vol. V p. 479)

John of Damascus (c. 675-c. 745), an eighth century Church Father, wrote the closest thing to a systematic theology in the early Church, Exposition of the Catholic Faith. In it he explained that God made man a rational being endowed with free-will and as a result of the Fall man’s free-will was corrupted (Book 3 Chapter 14, NPNF Second Series Vol. IX, p. 58-60).

Saint John of the Ladder (579-649), a seventh century Desert Father, in his spiritual classic, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, wrote:

Of the rational beings created by Him and honoured with the dignity of free-will, some are His friends, others are His true servants, some are worthless, some are completely estranged from God, and others, though feeble creatures, are His opponents (Step 1.1; emphasis added).

A more exhaustive listing can be found in Mako Nagasawa’s “Free Will In Patristics” (August 2013).  Interestingly, this paper was written in response to the same passage in Calvin’s Institutes 2.2.4.

A survey of the early Christian writings show the following: (1) the doctrine of human free will was taught by the Apostolic Fathers (Ignatius of Antioch and in the Letter to Diognetus), (2) it was affirmed by the Apologists (Justin Martyr and Athenagoras), (3) it was taught by leading church fathers like Irenaeus of Lyons, Athanasius the Great, and Gregory the Great, (4) it was taught by Latin Fathers (Cyprian of Carthage), (5) it was taught by Syrian Fathers (John of Damascus), (6) it was taught by the Desert Fathers (John of the Ladder), and (7) it was affirmed by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Cyril in his catechetical lectures.  It is inexplicable, not to mention inexcusable, for Calvin to have refused to engage this wide ranging patristic consensus.  Calvin in contrast relied almost exclusively on one later church father, Augustine of Hippo.  Furthermore, Augustine’s teaching on human free will were written in response to the Pelagian heresy and do not present a balanced position.

Using the Vincentian Canon, Calvin’s denial of human free will cannot be considered part of the catholic faith.  Unlike the affirmation of human free will which can be found in the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists who lived in the second century, Calvin made no appeal to the Ante-Nicene Fathers; thus he fails on the grounds of antiquity. In contrast to Augustine who was a North African bishop, patristic witness to free will can be found across the ancient world: Gaul, Italy, Asia Minor, North Africa, Syria, not to mention the major sees of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.  Thus Calvin’s argument also fails on the grounds of ubiquity.   At best it can be considered a personal opinion, but not the catholic and universal teaching of the Church.

 

Not a Fluke

Calvin’s denigration of the church fathers was not an off the cuff or in the heat of the moment hyperbole.  Calvin meant what he wrote.  As a matter of fact, he repeated this point again in the chapter 2.2.9 (pp. 266-267).

Perhaps I may seem to have brought a great prejudice upon myself when I confess that all ecclesiastical writers, except Augustine, have spoken so ambiguously or variously on this matter that nothing certain can be gained from their writings.  . . . .  But I meant nothing else than that I wanted simply and sincerely to advise godly folk; for if they were to depend upon those men’s opinions in this matter, they would always flounder in uncertainty.  At one time these writers teach that man, despoiled of the powers of free will, takes refuge in grace alone.  At another time they provide, or seem to provide, him with his own armor.  (Institutes 2.2.9; emphasis added.)

Calvin’s refusal to provide supporting evidence is distressing.  What we have here is not scholarship, but dogmatism.

Calvin’s almost exclusive reliance on Augustine of Hippo is alien to the theological method of the early Christians as described in the Vincentian Canon: quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus (What has been believed everywhere, always, and by all.).  (Commonitory Chapter 2.6)   After citing Origen, Calvin skips over the early Greek fathers to the medieval scholastics: Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109), Peter Lombard (c. 1095-1169), and Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274).  Here Calvin is operating as a Western theologian who does theology independently of the patristic consensus.

But some hard questions need to be asked about Calvin’s theological method.  First, was Calvin wiser than the host of early Church Fathers?  Did the Apostles’ disciples and their successors drop the ball?  That is, rather than carefully guard the Apostolic deposit, they carelessly let it be modified to follow their own personal insights or to please their congregations?  That right doctrine disappeared and was replaced by heresy?  The answer to these questions is: No.  History shows that in their wrestling with the issues and questions raised by Greek philosophers and various heresies they sought to be faithful to Holy Tradition.  Furthermore, history shows the early Christians willing to die for the Faith rather than to resort to compromise.  The more one takes the time to read and learn what the church fathers believed and taught, the more confidence one has that the Holy Spirit did indeed make good on the promise of Christ to teach and lead the Orthodox Church into all truth.

 

Findings and Conclusions

Institutes 2.2.4 and 2.2.9 provide tremendous insights into Calvin’s theological method.  We find that despite his familiarity with the early church fathers and his willingness to cite them Calvin was in fact far removed from the patristic method.  He had no interest in learning where the patristic consensus stood on particular issues.  For an Orthodox Christian this attitude is alarming.

But even more shocking was Calvin’s airy dismissal of the church fathers on the grounds that their teachings were confused and contradictory.  He gives no supporting evidence.  Given his reputation as a first rate theologian this is a damning indictment.  It suggests not intellectual deficiency but arrogant obstinacy.

If it is true that Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination is at odds with the patristic consensus, then it cannot be considered part of the catholic faith.  If that is the case then double predestination is at best a personal opinion or at worst a heresy.  The Orthodox Church in the Confession of Dositheus condemned it as “profane and impious” (Decree III, in Leith Creeds of the Churches, p. 488)

It is imperative that modern day Reformed Christians take another look at the early church fathers’ teachings on free will and our salvation in Christ.  The classic Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura does not exclude patristic sources.  See my review of Keith Mathison’s The Shape of Sola Scriptura.  What is needed is for a contemporary Reformed scholar to investigate the church fathers and determine whether or not the Reformed position on double predestination is consistent with the church fathers or whether Calvin was right in asserting that the church fathers were inconsistent and contradictory in their teachings on free will.

 

Church Fathers

In closing, I would urge modern day Calvinists to treat the early church fathers with respect and to be open to learning from them.  Disrespecting the church fathers is theologically dangerous.  It is to risk being alienated from church history, from our spiritual heritage.  Not being anchored in the early church fathers put one at risk of either unthinking fundamentalism or syncretistic liberalism.

 Robert Arakaki

In Defense of “Plucking the TULIP”: A Response to Jacob Aitken

 

On 8 August 2013, Jacob Aitken, the administrator for Reformed Principia aka Bayou Huguenot aka Outlaw Presbyterianism, posted what he claims to be a rebuttal of my article: “Plucking the TULIP: Part I.”  PDF file.

See Aitken’s Responding to Orthodox Bridge: Part One.  Below is my response to him.

 

TULIP = Calvinism?

Jacob Aitken writes:

Arakaki identifies Calvinism with TULIP with Predestination.  In doing so he is operating off of the severely challenged “Calvin vs. the Calvinists” Paradigm.  This paradigm states in its various forms that Reformed theology is a decretal theology centered around the doctrine of Predestination.  The work of Richard A Muller has effectively buried this thesis (Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vo. 1, Christ and the Decree).

In one sense my rebuttal is already complete.  Arakaki thinks that the Reformed faith is predestination is TULIP.  By rebutting him along these lines I give credence to his flawed analysis, such that it is.  I suppose it can’t be helped.

First of all, let me state that Calvin’s theological system is a rich and complex one.  Double predestination is one particular doctrine taught by Calvin among others, but it cannot be denied that it was significant and integral to his theology.  Further, I would assert that for many adherents of Reformed Christianity the doctrine of double predestination is central to their theology because it arises from their understanding of divine sovereignty.  Ironically, my personal theological orientation prior to becoming Orthodox was Mercersburg Theology which did not give much emphasis to double predestination.  But the working premise of my blog posting was that for many Reformed Christians TULIP = Calvinism.

I have several questions for Jacob Aitken on this matter.  One, is it not a fact that for many adherents to Reformed Christianity the doctrine of double predestination is an integral and indispensable doctrine?  Two, are you saying that double predestination falls into the category of adiaphora, that one can be Reformed without holding to double predestination?  Three, if so what is the distinctive core doctrine(s) to Reformed theology?

 

By What Confessional Authority?

Mr. Aitken writes:

However, in a footnote he says, “Unlike Lutheranism with its Formula of Concord, the Reformed tradition has no confessional statement with a similar normative stature (Pelikan 1984:236).”  I was stunned when I read this.  Does he not realize that the 3 Forms of Unity are ecclesiastically binding upon Dutch and German Reformed Churches?   He says above that the Canons of Dort represent the Church’s teaching.  Did he forget that he just said that?  Does he not realize that the Westminster Standards not only are binding upon Anglo-American Reformed Churches, but when interpreted in the light of the Solemn League and Covenant, are binding upon the kingdoms of England, Ireland, and Scotland?  If he cannot get these most basic points established, what hope does the reader have that he will be able to seriously represent the intricacies of Reformed Theology?

It should be noted that I did not assert that there was no binding confessional authority in the Reformed tradition; what I asserted was that there was no confessional authority similar to the normative stature of the Formula of Concord among Lutherans.  To refute my footnote about the Lutheran Formula of Concord, all Mr. Aitken needs to do is demonstrate that there is one confessional statement binding on all Reformed churches or at least comparable in stature to the Formula of Concord.  This he fails to do.  If anything he supports my point when he asserts that the 3 Forms of Unity (Belgic Confession, the Canons of Dort, and the Heidelberg) are binding on Dutch and German Reformed churches, while the Westminster Confession is binding on the Anglo-American Reformed churches.  No one confession binds both the Anglo-American and the Continental Reformed theological traditions.  This is why in “Plucking the TULIP” I took care to supplement my quotes from the Canons of Dort with that from the Westminster Confession and other Anglo Reformed confessions.  Furthermore, my footnote was based on an observation by Jaroslav Pelikan.  Mr. Aitken has unwittingly called into question the scholarship of the widely respected Yale professor of Christian history and author of the magisterial five volume: The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine.

The largest Reformed body is the World Communion of Reformed Churches which represents about 80 million believers. That world body recognizes 3 confessions: the Belgic Confession, the Canons of Dort, and the Heidelberg Confession.  So there isn’t “a” single confession representing the Reformed Church, but rather three.  Predestination IS a major doctrine within the Canons of Dort. Reformed like to “hush, hush” predestination, or in some way minimalize its doctrine within the Reformed Church, as it is quite discriminatory (and therefore against modern sensibility). However, there has been no action within the Reformed Church to officially repeal or dismiss the doctrine of predestination.

I would note that Mr. Aitken claims membership with NAPARC (North American Presbyterian and Reformed Council), a much smaller body that claims a little over half a million members. Neither does this particular body claim one single confession as preeminent among the various confessional statements.  And even more striking is the fact that neither the World Communion of Reformed Churches nor the North American Presbyterian and Reformed Council have officially affirmed human free will with respect to regeneration.  All that Mr. Aitken has to show us is a quote from Richard Muller: “We believe in liberum arbitrium, free choice, which is a more accurate rendering than “free will.”  I challenge him to provide an excerpt from an official action by a Reformed body–past or present–that endorses Muller’s position on liberum arbitrium.

 

Total Depravity

Jacob Aitken took issue with my understanding that the Scots Confession teaches that as a result of the Fall the divine image was eradicated from human nature.  He writes:

Second, he thinks that defaced = eradicated.  It does not.  It means “marred.”

But even if “defaced” means “marred,” what are we to make of the fact that the adverb “utterly” preceded “defaced”?  The Scots Confession Chapter 3 states:

By this transgression, generally known as original sin, the image of God was utterly defaced in man, and he and his children became by nature hostile to God, slaves to Satan, and servants to sin.

If human nature was utterly marred as a result of the Fall, wouldn’t that lead us to think that it means the eradication of the divine image from human nature?  Mr. Aitken fails to prove his point here.  His etymological analysis which fails to take into account the rules of grammar—the adverb modifies the verb—leads to a seriously flawed argument.

Further, Mr. Aitken makes two questionable quotations, one from the nineteenth Princeton theologian, Charles Hodge, and the other from the Lutheran Formula of Concord.  While the two sources make statements that neatly and logically bolster Aitken’s position, their relevance has yet to be established.  What Aitken should have done but failed to do was to cite from Reformed confessional documents.  It seems to me that he is approaching the matter from the standpoint of ahistorical logic, whereas I am approaching the matter historically and ecclesially.

 

Augustine Versus Irenaeus

Jacob Aitken writes:

One may legitimately ask, though, why Irenaeus’ reading is to be preferred to Augustine’s?  Irenaeus doesn’t offer anything resembling a logical argument, nor does Arakaki.  There is nothing here for me to rebut because there is no logical argument.

There are two major theological paradigms for understanding the Fall.  Western Christianity in both its Roman Catholic and Protestant expressions has been heavily influenced by Augustine of Hippo, while Eastern Orthodoxy has been influenced by Irenaeus of Lyons.  Jacob Aitken complains that I do not present a logical argument for preferring Irenaeus over Augustine.  I have two responses.  One, the biblical text can be read either way and that the way one reads Genesis 3 depends much on which theological tradition one belongs to.  Two, I would note that neither did Mr. Aitken present a logical argument for preferring Augustine over Irenaeus.  Since he is so concerned about logical argument it is incumbent on him to provide a logical argument for giving preference to Augustine over Irenaeus.

 

Patristic Consensus Versus Medieval Scholasticism

Jacob Aitken is dismissive of my appeal to the patristic consensus.  He writes:

I couldn’t help but chuckle at this since Orthodoxy has its own narrowness.  Lossky, anybody?  Arakaki mentions the “patristic consensus.”  This will figure later into his argument on Scripture, but I will cut it off at the ford.   The Eastern Orthodox have yet to give a coherent, non-circular definition of the patristic consensus.

The next page in Arakaki’s paper is a litany of quotes from the Church fathers on free will.  Since I have already demonstrated the Reformed position on free will, and that Arakaki’s charges miss it, I see no point in responding to these patristic citations.

He complains that I do not employ the deductive logic of medieval Scholasticism.  My response is that I am using the ancient theological method expressed in the Vincentian Canon which places emphasis on catholicity and apostolicity.  The patristic consensus method has its origins in the Council of Jerusalem: “Now the apostles and elders came together to consider the matter” (Acts 15:6, OSB).  This conciliar method agrees with Scriptures advocating Christian unity (John 17:20-23; Ephesians 4:1-6).   For the first millennium the Church was conciliar in its theological method and Eastern Orthodoxy to this day continues to adhere to this ancient way of doing theology.

There are two major problems with the theological method of medieval Scholasticism favored by Mr. Aitken.  One, it is at odds with the theological methods of the early church fathers.  Two, it is an innovation that arose from the insertion of the pre-Christian philosopher Aristotle into Western Christianity.

I issue a two-fold challenge to Mr. Aitken: (1) demonstrate the superior logic of medieval Scholasticism over the ancient patristic consensus method, and (2) either show that deductive Aristotelian logic was employed by the early church fathers or that Christian theology is fundamentally evolutionary in nature.

Since Mr. Aitken is so concerned about the need for logical argumentation I present the following syllogism:

(1)  Epistemological validity is commonly based on the finding of the majority.  This is the method that forms the basis of scientific fact, democracy, and judicial opinion.

(2) Eastern Orthodoxy uses the consensus of the majority (Biblical, patristic, ecclesiastical, and lay) to inform its theology and practice.

(3) Therefore, Eastern Orthodoxy is epistemologically valid.

Liberum Arbitrium (Free Will)

On the subject of free will Jacob Aitken cites Richard Muller to make his point.  He writes:

Yet this is not what the Reformed believe.  We believe in liberum arbitrium, free choice, which is a more accurate rendering than “free will.”  As Richard Muller notes, “[T]he faculty of will (voluntas) is free and that the bondage into which humanity has fallen is not a bondage of the faculty of will as such” (Muller 1995, 176).  What has been lost, or rather limited, is the freedom of choice particularly to salvation.  Further, Will is distinct from intellect (intellectus) [330].  The intellect is that which knows objects, and the will is that which has a desire for them.

What is striking is Mr. Aitken’s failure to quote from Calvin or the major Reformed confessions.  While Muller’s scholarship is not in doubt, the question here is whether Muller’s writings supersede that of the Reformed confessions.  Furthermore, is Mr. Aitken saying that Prof. Muller speaks with authority for the Reformed tradition today?

The issue before us is not the lack of human free will with respect to external matters but with respect to our salvation in Christ.  What does Mr. Aitken make of the following statement from the Second Helvetic Confession Chapter 9: “Wherefore, man not yet regenerate has no free will for good, no strength to perform what is good.”?  And Chapter IX.iii in the Westminster Confession  “Of Free Will” we find: “Man, by his Fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation….”  And Chapter X.ii of the Westminster Confession “Of Effectual Calling” we find: “This effectual call is of God’s free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.”

 

Jacob Aitken’s Conclusion

Mr. Aitken ended his blog posting with: “I think I have demonstrated that the author has not read the Reformed sources, does not show an adequate understanding of official Reformed documents, and offers little in the way of an actual analysis and critique.”  One, a quick glance at my multiple citations from Reformed confessions will show that it is ludicrous to claim “the author has not read the Reformed sources.”  Two, I find the insinuation that Mr. Aitken has a superior understanding of official Reformed documents insulting and dubious.  As I reread Jacob Aitken’s blog posting I did a count of his sources: Reformed confessions = 0; Richard Muller = 2; Charles Hodge = 1; and Lutheran Formula of Concord = 1.  Three, the criticism that little has been offered “in the way of actual analysis and critique” leaves me wondering whether the criticism applies to me or to Mr. Aitken himself.  I leave that for the reader to decide.

 

My Concerns

My biggest concern has been the contentious tone of Jacob Aitken’s recent blog posting.  A friend after reading Aitken’s article commented: “It seems like he’s trying to pick a fight with you.”  I am not upset with the theological differences between me and Mr. Aitken as with his calling into question my scholarship.  I have tried to ensure that my blog postings on the OrthodoxBridge are based on careful scholarship.  I wrote this response to let readers know that I do stand by what I wrote and that I am willing to defend my positions.

In this age of Internet dialogue it is important that Christians across theological traditions treat each other with respect charity and respect.  Ad hominem attacks against another person’s character are to be avoided and shunned.  I welcome responses from others, but I expect them to be based on an accurate understanding of what the other side is saying and respectful in tone.  Regretfully, I find these lacking in Jacob Aitken’s criticisms.  For these reasons I do not wish to respond further to him until these concerns have been addressed.

 

Our Christian Heritage

To our readers, visitors, and lurkers, beyond the differences over predestination, it should be recognized that human anthropology, our being made in God’s image and likeness, is a much bigger issue than either of our—Jacob and my—scholarship.  It is critical that we all understand how the historic Church has understood what the Scriptures teach concerning human nature and our salvation in Christ. Tragically, the Orthodox tradition historically reflecting what the Holy Spirit taught to the early church fathers has largely been lost from view in our day of splintered Protestantism, obsession with scholastic logicalism, and an ecclesiology detached from history. It is our hope to present serious and sincere Reformed readers with consistent exposure to the church fathers and thus to the historic Church’s thinking on this and other matters.  The teachings of the early church fathers constitute a precious ancient heritage that many Protestants have yet to discover and claim as their own.

For our Protestant friends who want to learn from the early church fathers may I suggest that they read my earlier article: “Defending the Vincentian Canon: A Response to Outlaw Presbyterianism.”  In addition to learning about the fifth century church father, Vincent of Lerins, the reader will also see how this present blog posting is a repeat of an earlier clash between me and Jacob Aitken.  Two articles that Baptists and Evangelicals might find intriguing are: “Baptist Questions About Ignatius of Antioch” and “Patristics for Baptists.”  For Protestants who are wary or curious about Tradition, I recommend: “Tradition: Family, Friend, or Foe” by guest contributor “Nicodemus.”

Robert Arakaki

 

« Older posts Newer posts »